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Modern Small Satellites - Changing the Economics of Space  
This paper charts the rise of small satellites exploiting commercial off-the-shelf 
technologies to widen access to space and stimulate new business opportunities 
By Martin Sweeting 
ABSTRACT | Earth orbiting satellites come in a wide range of shapes and sizes to meet a diverse variety of uses 
and applications. Large satellites with masses over 1000kg support high resolution remote sensing of the Earth, 
high bandwidth communications services and world-class scientific studies but take lengthy developments and are 
costly to build and launch. The advent of commercially available, high-volume and hence low cost microelectronics 
has enabled a different approach through miniaturisation. This results in physically far smaller satellites that 
dramatically reduces timescales and costs and that are able to provide operational and commercially viable 
services. This paper charts the evolution and rise of small satellites from being an early curiosity with limited utility 
through to the present where small satellites are a key element of modern space capabilities. 
KEYWORDS | Small satellites; microsatellite; nanosatellite; cubesat; NewSpace1 
I.       INTRODUCTION 
The exploration and exploitation of space has been a costly 
endeavour, but one that has undoubtedly yielded a vastly 
improved understanding of our planet, our solar system and 
the wonders of the universe. Society now takes the day-to-
day benefits of space for granted, whether it be for improved 
weather forecasting, ubiquitous communications and 
navigation, or the response to natural or man-made disasters. 
Indeed, the functioning of the developed world has become 
dependent on space to provide economic and social 
infrastructure, not forgetting the dependence on space 
capabilities to support effective security and military 
operations. 
The dawn of mankind’s space era in 1957 with the launch of 
Sputnik-1 by the Soviet Union precipitated a predominantly 
military and political response, triggering the well-known 
space race of the 1960’s. Early space efforts were dominated 
by striving for political ‘one-up-man ship’ through the 
exploration of the solar system and human spaceflight, 
culminating in the Apollo Moon landings, and gaining 
military advantage from the ‘high ground’ of Earth for 
surveillance and communications. The economic 
exploitation of satellites to provide civil communications, 
primarily for voice and television, and Earth observation 
(EO) for meteorology and land resources was controlled 
tightly by governments. Building satellites required 
technically advanced and expensive capabilities, launchers 
were likewise costly and risky, and the ground infrastructure 
was complex. All of these combined to make access to space 
the preserve of only the most technically advanced and 
economically wealthy of nations. This privileged access to 
space provided these ‘space nations’ with an overwhelming 
advantage over the space ‘have-nots’ resulting in a position 
of superiority enjoyed and taken for granted for some four 
decades. 
The balance of space power began to shift with the advent 
and widespread availability of microelectronics that enabled 
physically smaller satellites to be built by smaller teams with 
modest facilities and utilising ‘spare’ launch capacity as 
secondary payloads alongside larger (paying) brethren. Thus 
the early 1980’s ushered in the beginning of the era of the 
modern small satellite. 
                                                          
1 ‘NewSpace’ is a phrase commonly used to describe the emergence of a different ethos for space where the established aerospace methods and business have been challenged 
by more entrepreneurial private sector by adopting more agile approaches and exploiting the latest commercial-off-the-shelf technologies. It unfairly infers an ‘old space’, so the 
phrase is used in this paper without enthusiasm but provides a convenient shorthand. 
Of course, physically small satellites by themselves were 
nothing new; many of the early US and Soviet satellites and 
later experimental satellites from other nations would fall 
into this classification so that, over the last 60 years, some 
1500 satellites under ~100kg have been launched worldwide.  
However, what differentiates the later generation of 
‘modern’ small satellites discussed in this paper was the 
combination of a different management approach with the 
use of commercially-available microelectronics devices to 
create re-programmable, reconfigurable satellites capable of 
sophisticated functions with high utility in a fraction of the 
volume, mass, cost & timescales. 
Class Mass (kg) 
Large satellite >1000 
Small satellite 500 to 1000 
Mini-satellite 100 to 500 
Micro-satellite 10 to 100 
Nano-satellite 1 to 10 
Pico-satellite 0.1 to 1 
Femto-satellite <0.1 
Table-1: general classification of femto-pico-nano-micro-
mini-small-large satellites [1] 
Small satellites are a state of mind rather than defined simply 
by physical parameters. It is of course recognised that there 
is continuous innovation and development in the design and 
operation of large satellites but, carried out within large 
companies or institutions, these innovations are generally 
gradual and highly risk-adverse. There are very good reasons 
for this approach, as the satellites are often extremely costly 
and their objectives technically demanding. The long 
development cycles mean that the technology used once it 
reaches orbit may be over a decade behind the capability of 
the state-of-the-art and that applications or services therefore 
evolve gradually. The hallmark of the modern small satellite 
is the adoption of up-to-date consumer technologies 
combined with rapid development cycles executed by small 
agile teams operating closer to IT industry management 
models rather than those found in military/aerospace 
organisations [2]. 
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This paper endeavours to provide the background to the 
evolution of small satellites and highlight the key technical 
and business developments that have brought them into the 
space mainstream. The advent of ‘NewSpace’ has made this 
a very wide filed with a plethora of players, many of whom 
may turn out to be ephemeral, nevertheless a number of 
examples have been selected throughout the paper to 
illustrate the trend and it is recognised that there are many 
others that could equally have been used. 
II. SMALLSAT TECHNIQUES 
In 1950, Alan Turing, predicted that “by the turn of the 
century, computers would have a billion words of memory”.  
In 1965 Intel co-founder Gordon Moore observed that the 
number of transistors on a chip was increasing exponentially: 
doubling roughly every two years – or 10 times every 6.5 
years.  This trend has continued to the present day and the 
exponential rate of advance has stimulated an enormous 
commercial market for increasingly miniaturised industrial 
and consumer electronics. It has attracted huge investments 
and has driven manufacturing production processes to 
achieve high device volumes at very low unit cost with 
extreme reliability.  
The designers and manufacturers of large satellites have 
developed detailed processes to assure quality through 
rigorous batch testing of individual components with system 
reliability achieved through duplicate or triplicate 
redundancy. However the qualification time taken for 
components, often specially developed for space in small 
quantities, means that their capabilities are often decades 
behind that of the prevailing consumer technology.  
The revolution in microelectronics production techniques, 
developed for the consumer mass market of millions or 
billions of devices, has meant that random component 
failures have been virtually eliminated. When appropriately 
used in spacecraft, testing and performance assurance can be 
achieved more effectively and cheaply at sub-system level 
rather than screening individual components. Commercial-
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) microelectronics devices have thus 
effectively established a new benchmark for high reliability 
devices in space. COTS microelectronics devices employed 
on satellites, however, must be selected and used with due 
attention to their widely varying susceptibility to the effects 
induced by the radiation environment experienced in 
different Earth orbits, especially when travelling through or 
operating within the two main regions of trapped particles 
and when encountering highly energetic galactic ‘cosmic’ 
particles and rays. The induced effects vary from deposited 
charge causing a temporary change of state in a digital circuit 
through to disruption to the semiconductor crystal lattice that 
may cause a permanent reduction in performance or 
catastrophic failure. Thus designers need to be fully aware of 
the fabrication processes of individual COTS devices and 
assess their suitability for the orbital environment to be 
encountered. This can be a challenge, as the same device 
types from different manufacturing foundries can exhibit 
widely different susceptibility and, with a very rapid COTS 
development cycle, there may be little opportunity to gain 
substantial in-orbit heritage before the device becomes 
obsolete! Fortunately, with experience and careful study of 
the device structures combined with radiation testing, 
suitably selected COTS microelectronics has been shown to 
perform reliably and over long mission lifetimes in both low 
and medium Earth orbits. 
Small satellite builders were early adopters of these 
innovative COTS technologies in order to overcome the 
limitations imposed by their small budgets and limited mass 
& volume. By adapting and carefully selecting devices for 
use in a space environment, they were to achieve high 
performance at increased functional density and low cost 
through miniaturisation and reduced power consumption. 
The use of rapidly evolving COTS microelectronics has not 
been limited simply to processor speed, the capacity of solid-
state memories, the density and sensitivity of imaging 
sensors, but also the on-board data handling peripherals – for 
example the use of the Controller Area Network (‘CAN’ bus) 
from the automotive industry where communications 
reliability is paramount. Developments in terrestrial 
communications techniques and devices have been exploited 
to enable ever higher communication link data rates within 
the limited energy budgets of small satellites, enabling them 
to achieve steadily higher EO resolution and coverage and 
increased communications capacities for LEO services. 
When conventional satellites first used on-board 
microcontrollers and then microprocessors, they employed 
fixed instruction sets that were ‘burned’ into PROM prior to 
launch and were unable to be reprogrammed in orbit. In the 
first instance largely driven by safety concerns during 
launch, the early microsatellite on-board computers were 
launched empty of operational software and hence, 
somewhat out of necessity, pioneered in-orbit 
reprogrammable, reconfigurable and adaptable platforms 
where functions could be replicated through the use of 
multiple different technology paths, further helping to avoid 
systematic component or design issues. As a result, small 
satellites often contain rather complex software and ensuring 
quality and reliability of code has become as important a 
component as the hardware.   
Alongside the exploitation of COTS hardware and (to a 
lesser extent) software, successful small satellite 
organisations adopted a different management approach – 
one more identified with the new agile IT industry. 
Specifically, small satellite teams and their projects 
exhibited: (a) Highly innovative technical staff; (b) Small, 
motivated teams; (c) Devolved responsibility, rigour and 
quality; (d) Good team communications, close proximity; (e) 
Well-defined mission objectives and constraints; (f) 
Knowledgeable use of modern components; (g) Layered, 
failure-resilient system architecture; (h) Sub-system burn-in 
rather than component screening; (i) Short timescale (to 
prevent possible escalation of objectives); (k) Design to cost 
(l) and run by well-informed and responsive management 
personnel. Such characteristics are best found in small 
companies or research teams, rather than in large aerospace 
organizations, who may find it difficult to adopt or modify 
the procedures, staff and structures necessary for large 
aerospace projects to those more appropriate to produce 
affordable small satellites. 
It is not possible to include the full range of small satellite 
activities and organisations in this paper and so, in the 
following sections, examples are taken to illustrate the 
evolution, current state and possible future developments of 
small satellites. There are many excellent detailed reviews 
and accounts of the development and role of small satellites 
and the reader is encouraged to read further about these. 
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF SMALLSAT CAPABILITIES 
The first satellites were physically small and lightweight due 
to the constraints of the available launchers, for example 
Sputnik-1 weighed 83kg and Explorer-1 was just 14kg, 
however as the launcher capability developed so the mass of 
the satellites rapidly grew – Sputnik-2 weighed 508kg and 
Sputnik-3 1327kg!  The US and Soviet Union then competed 
in the 1960s in a race to placed ever larger and more 
sophisticated spacecraft in orbit around the Earth and then 
the Moon.  
When charting the continuous development and evolution of 
small satellites from these early beginnings, it is perhaps 
helpful to consider how advances in available technologies 
gave rise to steps of their increasing capabilities and their 
applications.  
Stage-1:  power limited  
The first microsatellites were largely pioneered by radio 
amateurs [3] who, from the early days of the space era and 
with their innate experimental spirit, wanted to extend their 
hobby beyond the ionosphere and into space. A mere 4 years 
after Sputnik, a group of radio amateurs in California built 
a10kg satellite, OSCAR-1, which was launched 
in December 1961 as a secondary payload by a Thor-DM21 
Agena-B launcher from Vandenberg Air Force Base, 
California. This first radio amateur satellite, like Sputnik-
1, had no solar cells and carried a simple battery-powered 
radio beacon transmitting its message of “HI” in Morse code 
for three weeks until its on-board battery was depleted. 
Nevertheless, OSCAR-1 was the world’s first piggyback 
satellite and the world’s first private non-government 
spacecraft to be launched. 
Stage-2:  passive attitude stabilisation, fixed programme 
Solar cells and rechargeable batteries were rapidly adopted 
to achieve useful lifetimes in orbit and rudimentary attitude 
stabilisation techniques and fixed discrete component logic 
circuits employed to provide improved performance. The 
UK MoD small satellite ‘Prospero’ (66kg), successfully 
launched on the UK Black Arrow in 1971, used spin 
stabilisation and carried a tape recorder  on board, which 
lasted about 2 years and some 730 recordings. The US 
TELSTAR-1 made history by providing the first 
intercontinental satellite communications in 1962 as a spin-
stabilised 173kg small satellite in a low Earth orbit (LEO). 
In 1964 the US Transit satellites provided worldwide 
positioning, as the forerunner to GPS, initially 55kg spin-
stabilised satellites and later used gravity-gradient 
stabilisation. 
Radio amateurs steadily enhanced the capabilities of their, 
literally, home-built small satellites and by OSCARs 6, 7, & 
8 in the 1970's they had developed analogue communications 
transponders operating at VHF & UHF in low Earth orbit – 
all launched again as secondary payloads accompanying 
larger institutional missions. These microsatellites had very 
coarse attitude stabilisation, simply using permanent 
magnets and eddy current dampers to align approximately 
along the geomagnetic field lines and black/white painted 
antennas to impart a slow spin for thermal balance that was 
adequate, if not ideal, for their experimental communications 
objectives. The functions of these radio amateur 
microsatellites were monitored by early digital logic 
                                                          
2 FIFO = ‘first-in-first-out” 
integrated circuits telemetry and relied on real-time control 
from the ground as they possessed no on-board 
reprogrammable computers. The Soviet Union also launched 
a series of 20 radio amateur satellites, dubbed Radio Sputnik 
or ‘RS’, the first two of which were launched together on 
October 26, 1978 carrying VHF to HF linear transponders, a 
telemetry beacon and a digital serial FIFO2 store Morse 
‘Codestore’ unit. The RS-1 and RS-2 satellites had no 
stabilisation and the transponders aboard operated for only a 
few months before battery problems disabled both 
spacecraft. Other Soviet spacecraft used several passive 
stabilisation techniques, such as gravity-gradient with 
limited nadir pointing precision. The coarse attitude control 
limited both the power generation and communications links 
for these small satellites. In 1986, Sweden launched its first 
satellite Viking-1 (550kg) spin stabilised into an elliptical 
polar orbit to study auroral plasma physics. 
Stage-3:  active control  
Advances in digital logic integrated circuits enabled a greater 
degree of capability but still limited operational flexibility. 
For example, the  UK ‘Miranda’ small satellite (93kg) was 
launched in 1971 using fixed logic control circuits but 
demonstrated a significant advance with a three-axis gyro 
system and innovative cold propane gas attitude control 
thrusters with sun and Earth sensors to achieve three-axis 
stabilisation. 
Greater flexibility and performance was achieved by the 
introduction of more highly integrated microprocessors. 
Whilst early and larger spacecraft such as Pioneer, Viking 
and Voyager contained CPUs fabricated from discrete logic, 
the first (civilian) satellite known to employ a true 
microprocessor (RCA 1802) was the 158kg US MAGSAT 
launched in 1979, although using a fixed instruction 
programme ‘burnt’ into PROM before launch to provide a 
more extensive menu of telecommands functions controlling 
the satellite’s operations. 
Stage-4: True flexibility 
The transition to the modern, reprogrammable small satellite 
occurred in 1981 with the launch of a 54kg micro-satellite 
UoSAT-1 (UoSAT-OSCAR-9) that included two in-orbit re-
programmable microcomputers. Built by a group of radio 
amateurs and researchers at the University of Surrey UK, 
drawing on the experience of the previous OSCAR missions 
and AMSAT personnel, UoSAT-1 was arguably the first 
civilian satellite that was reprogrammable in orbit. In fact, its 
on-board RCA1802 and Ferranti F100L microcomputers 
were launched empty of software, except for a ‘boot loader’, 
and a series of programmes were subsequently compiled on 
the ground and uploaded to the satellite. The previous year, 
a radio amateur communications satellite (AMSAT Phase-
3A 92kg) intended for a Molniya orbit included a 
reprogrammable RCA1802 CPU, however the satellite did 
not reach orbit due to an Ariane-4 launch failure.  UoSAT-1 
marked several additional innovations such as closed-loop 
magnetorquer-assisted gravity-gradient stabilisation and the 
first use of digitally synthesized voice transmissions at VHF 
NBFM3 for easy reception of telemetry by school children. 
The satellite operated for 8 years in a 550km low Earth orbit 
before re-entering on 13 October 1989, some 6 years beyond 
its expected design life. A second satellite  UoSAT-2 
(UoSAT-OSCAR-11, 60kg) was designed and built by the 
3 NBFM = narrow band frequency modulation (~15kHz) 
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same team in just 6 months and launched in 1984 on a NASA 
Delta as a secondary payload with LANDSAT-D’. It again 
carried two in-orbit reprogrammable on-board computers (an 
RCA1802 and NSC800), the latter enabling the first low 
Earth orbit digital store-&-forward email experiments before 
the world-wide-web and internet infrastructure was 
widespread. The UoSAT-2 digital voice synthesiser, based 
on a COTS product, was used in an innovative to 
communicate position data to a Canadian-Soviet Ski-trek 
arctic expedition in 1988. [4] 
AMSAT-OSCAR-10 (AO-10), a 140kg star-shaped German 
AMSAT micro-satellite, was launched alongside the 
European Test Satellite (ECS-1) on an Ariane 1-06 launcher 
in June 1983 into a geostationary transfer orbit (GTO) and, 
using an attached booster, this was changed to a Molniya 
orbit4 to support long distance amateur satellite 
communications using VHF and UHF transponders. AO-
10’s on-board Internal Housekeeping Unit (IHU) computer 
employed a simple computer design built around a single, 
radiation hardened RCA1802 microprocessor with just 
16KB of RAM to support the relatively routine 
housekeeping tasks. Eventually, in 2003, the on-board 
computer failed due to radiation damage of the memory 
devices.  
The US Department of Defense (DoD) and the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) started a 
LightSat initiative [5] in the mid‐1980s with the goal of 
reducing the costs and development time of small spacecraft 
in the 50–1000 kg range. The first microsatellite developed 
under this programme was GLOMR (Global Low‐Orbit 
Message Relay) un‐stabilized communications satellite 
(62 kg) launched on the Space Shuttle (STS‐61‐A, 1985) that 
provided transparent ‘bent-pipe’ and digital store‐and-
forward communications that collected sensor data from 
ground terminals. Its design included two CMOS (1802 
family) microprocessors – one for communications control, 
the other for scheduling, mass memory, housekeeping, and 
mission control, telemetry, and command functions. 
GLOMR re‐entered the atmosphere after 14 months in orbit 
and was followed by GLOMR-2/MACSAT improved 
systems. Radio amateurs continued the civilian development 
of digital store-and-forward communications through the 
Japanese FUJI-OSCAR-12, an Amateur Radio 
communications satellite launched on a Japanese H-1 
launcher in 1986 that used an NSC-800 CPU and 1 Mbyte of 
dynamic RAM. In 1992 the joint Swedish-German spin-
stabilised Freja (256kg) minisatellite was launched as a 
secondary payload on a Chinese Long March II  rocket and 
followed the earlier Viking-1 mission to carry out more 
detailed studies of auroral plasma physics and carried a re-
programmable processor with 15MB of memory. 
The above examples illustrate the key impact made on the 
capability and utility of small satellites through the 
introduction of early in-orbit reprogrammable 
microcomputers. 
Stage-5: Emerging utility 
Despite these advances, during the 1980’s microsatellites 
were largely considered to be ‘of interest but little real use’, 
except perhaps for education and training. Larger satellites 
                                                          
4 Molniya orbit = highly elliptical orbit with an inclination of 63.4 degrees, 
an argument of perigee of −90 degrees and an orbital period of one half 
of a sidereal day. 
were becoming ever more impressive in their capabilities 
and provision of services, but at a cost in both time and 
money, and microsatellites were seen as somewhat of an 
unwelcome distraction. However, as microsatellite technical 
capabilities gradually developed throughout the 1990’s, 
interest grew in their use for technology demonstration and 
verification, new digital services prior to widespread internet 
infrastructure, rudimentary Earth observation, radio science 
and military applications and, in particular, training 
programmes for developing space nations. By the early 
2000’s, micro-mini-satellites were capable of meeting 
operational and commercial needs. 
The NASA SMEX (Small Explorer) programme [6] 
commenced in 1988 to provide frequent opportunities for 
highly focused and relatively inexpensive space science 
missions on mini-satellites (SAMPEX, FAST, TRACE, 
SWAS, and WIRE).  
The first microsatellite to provide some semi-commercial 
communications services was the 50kg UoSAT-3 satellite, 
launched on Ariane-4 in 1990 carrying several payloads, one 
of which provided digital store-&-forward communications 
for use with low cost, portable ground stations. SatelLife, [7] 
a U.S. non-profit organization, provides desperately needed 
low cost 'last mile' communication links between medical 
institutions and health programmes in the developing world 
used the UoSAT-3 payload for communications trials. A 
follow-on dedicated HealthSat-2 microsatellite was 
completed from concept to launch within one year and 
launched in 1993, again on Ariane-4, to form the operational 
HealthNet global communications system.  
The AFRL (Air Force Research Laboratory) MightySat 
programme [8] in 1994 created opportunities using small 
satellites for frequent, inexpensive, on‐orbit demonstrations 
of emerging space system technologies and to accelerate 
their transition into operational military use. In 1995 & 1999, 
the French Direction Générale de l'Armement (DGA) 
launched two 50kg microsatellites, Cerise and Clémentine 
using the SSTL microsatellite platform [9] to demonstrate 
intelligence gathering missions targeting low frequency 
electronic signals from targeted regions in the 20 MHz-
1 GHz range. These were the forerunners of the later French 
Essaim ELINT constellation (2005 Ariane-5) comprising 
four 120 kg micro satellites that flew in formation. 
(Incidentally, Cerise was hit by a catalogued space 
debris object from an Ariane rocket in 1996, [10] making it 
the first verified case of an accidental collision between two 
artificial objects in space although the Cerise satellite 
survived and was returned to service some 6 months later.) 
The pace of development of small satellite complexity and 
capabilities accelerated in the late 1990’s. This was 
especially stimulated by a series of international 
collaborations with emerging space nations wishing to take 
advantage of affordable access to space through 
microsatellite missions that could not only meet national 
needs but also be used to train indigenous personnel. These 
largely training missions also provided opportunities to 
develop and test new COTS devices and techniques in orbit 
rapidly in a step-wise managed-risk manner.  In particular, a 
series of microsatellites demonstrated steadily improved 
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Earth observation capabilities from KITSat and PoSAT in 
1994/5 (1km GSD5 NIR) to ThaiPhutt the first multi-spectral 
imaging microsatellite to achieve 300m GSD (NIR, red, 
green, blue) – nevertheless, whilst interesting and 
educational, the image resolution and fidelity had no real 
commercial value.  An example of useful science, however, 
came from the Chilean FASat-Bravo microsatellite (1998) 
that carried an instrument to monitor the distribution of 
ozone comprising two nadir-pointing UV cameras, one 
operating with CCD detectors, the other with UV 
photodiodes to derive relative global maps of total ozone 
concentrations that was calibrated against the NASA TOMS 
mission data [11]. FASat-Bravo also demonstrated an early 
use of the CAN-bus6 on a microsatellite. All these 
microsatellites used 2-D CCD arrays for imaging as the 
attitude stability was not yet sufficient for the use of linear 
(line-scan) arrays. Microsatellite missions such as BIRD, S-
80/T, Astrid-1, FAISAT and mini-satellites such as UoSAT-
12, INTA-Minisat and AMPTE demonstrated steadily 
improved capabilities. At the end of the decade, four 
example missions can be used to illustrate that small 
satellites were approaching the threshold of real utility.  
The first example was UoSAT-12 [12], a 300kg 
minisatellite, that used the avionics that had been developed 
for earlier microsatellites and added propulsion and an on-
board GPS receiver enabling orbital manoeuvring, reaction 
wheels and star cameras enabling precision attitude control 
and pointing, and microwave downlinks dramatically 
increasing data transfer. UoSAT-12 carried an experimental 
analogue and digital regenerative transponder, MERLION, 
built with NTU (Singapore) [13] with an L-band uplink and 
S-band downlink, and a 30m GSD camera 5-band 
multispectral alongside a ‘high resolution’ (for the time) NIR 
Earth observation camera using COTS optics to achieve 10m 
GSD panchromatic imaging. Launched in 1998 on the first 
orbital launch of the Russian DNEPR SS18 converted 
ICBM, UoSAT-12 demonstrated commercial quality Earth 
imaging from a small satellite and the use of Internet 
Protocols (IP) in communicating with the spacecraft; it is 
believed to be the first civil satellite to have had its own web 
address in orbit.  
The second example was DLR-TUBSAT (1999 PSLV 
720km SSO) that carried 3 COTS video cameras using Sony 
CCD array systems with Nikon optics providing 370m, 
120m & 6m resolution images still and video transmitted in 
real-time to the ground at S-band. Impressively, the satellite 
attitude and hence camera pointing were simply controlled 
via keyboard, joystick or mouse control commands from a 
groundstation terminal. [14] 
The third example is the 6.5kg SNAP-1 nanosatellite [15], at 
the other end of the smallsat scale, launched in June 2000 on 
a Russian Cosmos-3M launcher from the Plesetsk 
Cosmodrome, into a 700km SSO with the primary payload 
Nadezhda, a Russian COSPAS-S&RSAT (Search & Rescue 
Satellite) payload. The SNAP-1 objectives were to 
demonstrate miniature electrical and mechanical COTS 
technologies on capable nano-satellites and their use as 
autonomous robots for observing orbiting space 
vehicles.  The SNAP-1 nanosatellite was three-axis 
                                                          
5 GSD = Ground Sample/Sampling Distance  
6 A Controller Area Network (CAN bus) is a robust vehicle bus standard 
designed to allow microcontrollers and devices to communicate with 
each other in applications without a host computer. 
stabilized (<1º) by a single Y-momentum wheel and 
magnetorquers for nutation damping and wheel momentum 
management. Attitude was sensed by a three-axis 
magnetometer and sun sensors and 50-gram GPS receiver 
used for autonomous orbit determination, on-board 
navigation parameters and timing and performed differential 
orbit determinations in conjunction with a co-passenger 50kg 
microsatellite. SNAP-1 carried a machine vision based upon 
a COTS CMOS video system with Active Pixel Sensor 
technology to enable it to act as a remote inspector of the 
host Nadezhda satellite (picture) and also provide time-lapse 
video of the Earth’s surface. SNAP-1 included a miniature 
propulsion system comprising a 30 µN heated thruster with 
a delta-v capacity of 3 m/s. This was used firstly to 
demonstrate orbit control (the primary objective) by 
maintaining its altitude by overcoming the relative 
atmospheric drag effects, and then also to climb up to an 
altitude about 1 km higher than that of the companion 
microsatellite and attempt an ‘arms-length’ rendezvous. A 
long sequence of thruster firings was initiated under the 
automatic control of the OBC, and the GPS navigation 
system was used to keep track of the orbital changes by 
means of the propulsion manoeuvres. Whilst a true 
rendezvous was not achieved, the agility and 
manoeuvrability of SNAP-1 under automatic control was 
amply demonstrated, meeting its objectives of demonstrating 
that nanosatellites can be constructed rapidly to achieve 
sophisticated mission requirement and demonstrated a 
number of firsts for a nanosatellite: the first fully 3-axis 
attitude stabilized nanosatellite; the first nanosatellite with 
on-board propulsion demonstrating orbit control; the first in-
orbit images of another spacecraft from a nanosatellite; the 
first successful use of a GPS receiver on-board a 
nanosatellite used for orbit manoeuvring. 
The fourth example is the ESA ‘PROBA’ series of 
microsatellites, the first of which launched in 2001 [16] 
explored on-board autonomy and a miniaturised 
hyperspectral camera (CHRIS) [17] that provided 19 spectral 
bands (fully programmable out of 150 channels) in the VNIR 
range (400 - 1050 nm) at a GSD of 17m or configured to 
provide 63 spectral bands at a spatial resolution of about 
34m. Nearly 20,000 environmental science images have 
been acquired from PROBA-1.  
Small satellites attracted further attention in military circles 
since they offered potential advantages in an unpredictable 
world by representing small and hence less conspicuous 
targets in orbit and the potential for rapid, responsive 
deployment. In addition to Russia and France, the US DoD 
gradually developed a new space operations concept, called 
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS), which called for the 
rapid development and launch of spacecraft to augment or 
partially replace existing spacecraft. The objective was to 
develop both new small launch vehicles for small satellites 
using standardised buses and plug‐and‐play architectures to 
shorten dramatically the development time required for such 
missions. The first spacecraft in the programme, TacSat‐2 
(370 kg) was launched on 16 December 2006. In July 2007 
DARPA initiated ‘System F6’ to describe the programme as 
“future, fast, flexible, fractionated, and free‐flying” to create 
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a self‐forming network of spacecraft nodes that together act 
like a single satellite. However, whilst these programmes 
adopted the technology approaches of small satellites, they 
largely failed to adopt the other essential component of light-
touch management, procurement and approach to risk: 
consequently the result was small, capable but very costly 
satellites! 
There are several other examples of small satellites used for 
government/military applications such as the SAR-Lupe 
(770kg) reconnaissance satellite [18] to provide high-
resolution radar imagery to German defence forces.  Five 
SAR-Lupe satellites  have been launched into three orbital 
planes on Cosmos (Russia 2006-08),  into an average altitude 
of ~500 km, near-polar orbits (98.2º) providing 0.5m 
resolution in spotlight mode to 8m in ScanSAR mode. The 
Israeli MoD (Ministry of Defense) launched its first space 
borne radar minisatellite technology demonstration mission 
TecSAR (300kg PSLV 2008), designed and developed by 
IAI/MBT, however few specific detailed characteristics are 
available. [19] 
Small satellites had attracted attention by offering useful 
capabilities, but had not yet made it into the mainstream of 
space activities. Largely demonstration missions were not 
yet really operational and government small satellite 
programmes were still somewhat ponderous and costly.   
Stage-6: Early LEO constellations 
To achieve persistent widespread or global coverage from 
low Earth orbit, it is necessary to construct constellations of 
satellites. In the early 1990’s, several commercial proposals 
emerged for constellations of small satellites operating in 
LEO to take advantage of the advances in digital 
communications technologies to provide worldwide 
communications, focusing on services not provided by the 
established geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) satellites – 
primarily for machine-to-machine (M2M) low-rate data and 
mobile voice communications especially at high latitudes.  
The first, and most successful of these, was Orbcomm [20] 
with its initial launch in 1991 building up to around 50 
satellites in five orbital planes each weighing 40-45kg and 
mostly launched on the US Pegasus air launch system into 
750km 47 degree inclination orbits supporting M2M 
messages of typically 25 to 500 characters through 14 Earth 
station gateway sites. A similar civilian messaging system, 
using 250kg GONETS small satellites [21], was launched by 
Russia in 1996, derived from the Strela military 
communication satellites and later versions, Gonets-M, 
continues to provide a satellite communications and data 
service for both private and state requirements to the present 
day. 
Two more ambitious, and costly, constellations targeted real-
time voice and data. Globalstar, [22] whose first generation 
satellites launched in 1998, weighed 550 kg in 1400km 52 
degree orbit planes and used a network of 24 
ground gateway stations to provide low latency (~60ms) 
transparent ‘bent-pipe’ connectivity from the around 50 
satellites to the public switched telephone network and 
Internet. However, Globalstar does not cover polar areas, due 
to the lower orbital inclination. On any given call, several 
                                                          
7 The size of hand-held terminals is primarily dictated by the link budgets 
to LEO (e.g. Iridium/Globalstar) or GEO (Inmarsat) rather than the 
attributes of small satellites.  
satellites transmit a caller's signal via CDMA technology to 
a satellite dish at the appropriate gateway where the call is 
then routed locally through the terrestrial 
telecommunications system. After investment losses of 
around $4.3 billion, the company went bankrupt in 2002 but 
underwent refinancing and emerged in 2002 with 24-satellite 
second generation Globalstar system using 700kg satellites.  
The Iridium constellation, established in 1998, comprised a 
system of around 66 active 689kg satellites in six 780km 
circular orbital planes spaced 30 degrees apart with 11 
satellites in each  providing a uniquely worldwide voice and 
data communication from hand-held satellite phones and 
other transceiver units. The system used more complex on-
board regenerative signal processing and microwave inter-
satellite links to manage the routing and hand-over of calls 
from one satellite to the next but operated voice channels at 
only 2.2–3.8 kbps, which requires very aggressive 
voice compression and decompression algorithms. The 
relatively cumbersome hand-held phone terminals7 (when 
compared to present-day smartphones) and high tariffs 
meant that the service appealed only to relatively wealthy 
users in remote regions, rather than the general consumer. 
Latency for data connections was still relatively high 
averaging 1800ms round-trip, highly variable depending on 
the path data takes through the satellite constellation. 
Although the technical challenges for the complex Iridium 
were largely met successfully, the business case was not and 
bankruptcy quickly followed in 1999 with investment losses 
of around $6Bn. As the constellation awaited the order to de-
orbit, a group of investors bought Iridium's assets, valued at 
$5.5 billion, for about $25 million and relaunched the service 
– without the burden of the initial capital outlay [23] 
although, compared with cellular-phone network operators, 
Iridium is still expensive for the consumer and the US DoD 
is currently an anchor customer. 
The Globalstar and Iridium business cases initially failed due 
a mismatch between the market demand and the cost of the 
technology development, the large number of satellites and 
the costly infrastructure required. Both were resurrected 
when the capital costs were written off and the operating 
costs alone then profitably supported the relatively small 
specialist user communities (by comparison to terrestrial 
networks), such as the Amundsen–Scott South Pole Station 
and military users. However, the financially painful 
experience with Globalstar and Iridium, from combined 
investment losses of in excess of US$ 10Bn, resulted in a 
dramatic loss of confidence in low Earth orbit constellation 
systems by the international financial investment community 
who would then not entertain any such proposals for the next 
15 years. 
It is of interest to note that, whilst both the Iridium and 
Globalstar satellites could be classified as ‘small’ in terms of 
physical size, their execution was more in line with 
traditional concepts. Orbcomm, on the other hand, was closer 
to the ‘smallsat’ concept and proved more successful. 
So the first 40 years of the space age were dominated by ever 
larger satellites. Huge and powerful GEO communications 
satellites brought the advantages of scale and economy for 
trunk and direct-to-home services whilst remote sensing and 
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science satellites grew to carry multiple payloads on the 
assumption of the same principle although, in practice, 
multi-instrument platforms turned out to be extremely 
expensive and incur inevitable compromises between 
instruments. Small satellites, whilst steadily improving, had 
not yet achieved the necessary combination of platform, 
payload and ground segment technologies, business case 
robustness and management technique and so were not a 
significant player.  
IV. SMALL SATELLITES BECOME OF AGE 
Somewhere around the year 2000, the modern smallsat 
concept matured sufficiently to be able to combine 
technology, cost and utility effectively to cross the threshold 
of commercial viability and it was in the application to Earth 
observation that small satellites made their greatest initial 
impact. Whereas the early microsatellite EO missions 
exploited area 2-D CCD area arrays due to their coarse 
attitude control, the combination of improved sensors, on-
board data storage handling capacity, precise pointing and 
attitude control and high speed data downlinks allowed the 
use of multispectral push-broom imagers greatly increasing 
performance and enabled the transition from demonstration 
missions to operational and commercial services. Several 
individual example microsatellite missions demonstrated the 
potential of small satellites for operational EO.  
BIRD (94kg 2001 PSLV 570km SSO) [24]was a DLR 
(German Aerospace Centre) microsatellite technology 
demonstration mission to observe fires/hot spots on Earth 
and verify a new type of two-channel cooled infrared sensor 
system on a microsatellite and on-board pre-processing 
techniques. BIRD operated successfully for 2 years 
downloading image data at 2.2 Mbps at S-band 
demonstrating its utility for fire detection until experiencing 
a gyro malfunction. [25] 
TopSat (120kg  launched in 2005 on a Cosmos-3M) [26] 
[27]was a three-axis stabilized high resolution Earth 
observation with an off-pointing capability of ±30º included 
a high-precision three-axis fibre-optic gyro for the  off-track 
and pitch compensation manoeuvres required for supporting 
Time Delay Integration (TDI). This  allowed the camera to 
“stare” at its target for a longer period of time - equivalent to 
increasing the exposure time on a camera – to yield 2.8 m 
GSD (Pan), 5.6 m GSD (MS). The image was tasked, 
captured and data downloaded in X-band at 11 Mbit/s direct 
to a mobile ground station within a few minutes from capture 
demonstrating significant military utility. TopSat 
demonstrated the capabilities and affordability of sovereign 
constellations of small satellites for classically high value 
remote sensing missions. 
SMART-1 (367kg 2003 Ariane-V) [28] was an example of a 
small satellite for exploration beyond Earth orbit. Physically 
about one metre across and lightweight in comparison to 
other probes, it demonstrated the use of electric propulsion 
with 58.8 kg of xenon to produce a delta-v of 2,737 m/s. 
SMART-1 was launched into a GTO and took just over a 
year to reach a 2,200 x 4,500km lunar orbit, completing its 
mission two years later with a deliberate impact onto the 
lunar surface. The mission is interesting because, whilst the 
satellite itself was relatively inexpensive, the cost of the 
necessary operations to support the year-long orbital transfer 
certainly was not! (The total budget by ESA was $170M). 
Small satellite constellations for Earth observation 
Whilst the capabilities of individual microsatellites were 
becoming useful, despite their relatively modest spatial and 
spectral resolutions, their real utility emerged through the 
formation of constellations, as the low cost and physical size 
of small satellites made building and launching EO 
constellations economically practicable and were able to add 
a new dimension to EO not affordable with large satellites – 
that of increased temporal resolution. The first examples of 
such EO microsatellite constellations were the Disaster 
Monitoring Constellation (DMC) [29], and RapidEye [30]. 
The DMC was an innovative and successful international 
project of remote sensing satellites led by the UK, where 
participating countries each owned their satellites 
individually but operated them collaboratively, exchanging 
data between the partners. Constructed at SSTL and 
launched on Cosmos and Dnepr all into 686km SSO, but 
owned and operated by Algeria, China, Nigeria, Spain, 
Turkey and UK, the DMC provided rapid response 
emergency Earth imaging for both national needs and 
international disaster relief. With 5 satellites in operation, the 
constellation could offer access to any location on the Earth’s 
surface at least once per day and achieved the responsiveness 
that is needed for emergencies and for disaster support, with 
images provided across the Internet from the designated 
satellite(s) and a member country's ground station within a 
day of a request being made. The DMC formally joined 
the International Charter for Space and Major Disasters in 
November 2005 and monitored the effects and aftermath of 
natural and man-made disasters such as flooding, landslides, 
earthquakes, forest fires worldwide occurring on average 
once per week. The DMC was particularly effective during 
the large scale Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004), Hurricane 
Katrina (2005) disasters. Imaging for disasters only used 
around 10-15% of the Constellations capacity and the 
remainder was used for national resource monitoring and 
supplying data into the commercial market. Seven DMC 
satellites were launched between 2003 and 2008 that were all 
built to a common standard to enable imagery to be 
interchanged. With 30-metres GSD (later 20-metres GSD) in 
3 spectral bands and a wide swath width of 600km and strips 
of over 1000km, the DMC microsatellites were able to far 
larger areas of imagery than, but at comparable resolution to, 
established government imaging satellites such as Landsat – 
without the need to assemble multi-temporal mosaics. DMC 
imagery was deliberately designed to be comparable to 
Landsat imagery in order to leverage the expertise and 
software of the large established remote sensing community 
used to working with Landsat data. The DMC satellites are 
also notable for communicating with their ground stations 
using the Internet Protocol for both payload data transfer and 
command and control, so extending the Internet into space. 
This included an on-board Internet router and the first use of 
the ‘bundle’ protocol in space where Sensor data was 
successfully delivered from the satellite using this 
disruption- and delay-tolerant networking protocol designed 
for the Interplanetary Internet. The UK-DMC satellite 
included a GPS reflectometry experiment, essentially a bi-
static radar technique that was used to measure average 
ocean wave heights to aid ship routing around high sea state 
areas. Nigeria’s second satellite in the DMC (300kg 
minisatellite NigeriaSat-2 2006 Dnepr) added a 2.5m GSD 
imager to the wide swath multispectral payload and was 
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accompanied by a third medium resolution microsatellite 
(NigeriaSat-X), built by Nigerian engineers at SSTL. 
RapidEye (156kg 2008 Dnepr 630km SSO) represented a 
major milestone in the Earth observation industry. It was the 
first fully commercial operational class Earth observation 
system using a constellation of 5 microsatellites that 
provided exceptional performance for their class and a full 
end-to-end commercial Earth Observation system. A 
dedicated Spacecraft Control Centre and an 80 Mbit/s X-
band data downlink ground station service was able to plan, 
acquire and process up to 5 million km2 of imagery every 
day from the 5-band multispectral imager (RGB, red edge, 
and near IR bands) with 6.5m GSD to generate land 
information products [31]. Although the satellites were 
designed and manufactured in a “smallsat” mentality mode, 
the top-level commercial management structure that was 
created resembled more a traditional space mission, which 
resulted in higher costs. The commercial operation of 
RapidEye, however, was not without its difficulties when the 
cost of operations forced the Company into bankruptcy in 
2011 with its subsequent acquisition by BlackBridge of 
Canada (and later in 2015 acquisition by Planet Labs) and, 
in a manner rather similar to both Iridium and Globalstar but 
on a far smaller scale, became profitable operations once the 
capital cost was written off. 
Small satellites for education, training & capacity 
building  
Modern microsatellites revolutionised space in the same way 
that the personal computer or ‘PC’ revolutionised 
computing.  The low cost of entry to space afforded by small 
satellites and their growing capabilities enabled any nation, 
government department, small companies and individual 
universities to access space directly in an affordable and low 
risk manner. Nations and organisations who wish to take 
their first steps into space need to learn from more 
experienced space users and to generate a cadre of trained 
personnel before establishing their own national agencies 
and academic or commercial presence in space. 
The growing space industry and the many associated service 
and scientific organizations require a steady flow of 
enthusiastic, trained and competent young engineers and 
scientists to meet the challenges of the future. Although 
microsatellites are physically small, they are nevertheless 
complex vehicles that exhibit virtually all the characteristics 
of a large satellite. This makes them particularly suitable as 
a focus for the education and training of scientists and 
engineers by providing a means of direct, hands-on 
experience at all stages and in all aspects (both technical and 
managerial) of a real satellite mission—from design, 
production, test and launch through to orbital operation.  
A very effective model to achieve this knowledge training 
and skills transfer using affordable microsatellites was led by 
the UK (University of Surrey & SSTL) through 18 
international programmes [32] carried out between 1985 and 
2017 involving teams undertaking combinations of academic 
training and research coupled with first-hand design, 
construction and management of associated small satellites.  
The programmes carried out in conjunction with Surrey have 
assisted in the formation of 5 new national space agencies 
and 6 spin-out companies, the most successful of which 
being Satrec Initiative of South Korea. Aside from Surrey, a 
few other organisations (e.g. Berlin Space Tech; Satrec 
Initiative) have also implemented successful training 
programmes and have enabled further build-up of capacity 
around the world. 
UNISEC-Global, an international non-profit body consisting 
of local-chapters across the world and established 
establishment in 2013 in Japan, has provided another forum 
to promote practical space development activities. Targeting 
mainly university level students, young researchers, their 
tutors, it encourages co-operation and knowledge-sharing on 
designing, developing, manufacturing, launching and 
operating micro/nano/pico satellites and rockets.   
CubeSats 
A CubeSat is a particular form-factor of a nano-satellite that 
is made up of multiples of 10×10×10 cm cubic units each 
with a mass of about 1.5kg. In 1999, California Polytechnic 
State University and Stanford University proposed the 
CubeSat specifications to enable graduate students to build a 
tiny satellite and thus develop the skills necessary for the 
design, manufacture, and testing of small satellites intended 
for low Earth orbit. The aim was to come up with a concept 
that would not only allow university groups to rapidly 
implement a small space mission, but also to ensure that the 
chances of being embarked on a space launch as a secondary 
passenger were maximized, by standardizing interfaces and 
reducing risk to (often much more expensive) co-passengers. 
Many earlier university nano-satellites were never 
completed and launched, and the yearly turnover of students 
was seen as one of the factors in their lack of success. The 
standardised form of cubesats and resulting availability of 
subsystem ‘building blocks’, helped to reduce the project 
timescale and overcome this difficulty. 
The CubeSat concept, as initially proposed, [33]did not set 
out to become a standard; rather, it became a standard over 
time as it became widely adopted by educational users. Since 
CubeSats are constructed of standard module unit of 
10×10 cm cross-section, they can be launched and deployed 
using a common encapsulated deployment system called a 
Poly-PicoSatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD), developed and 
built by Cal Poly. The P-POD has a standard interface to the 
launcher irrespective of the CubeSats it contains and this 
greatly reduces the complexity, effort and risk that would 
otherwise be required for mating a piggyback satellite with 
its launcher. Thus the CubeSat design specifically minimizes 
risk to the rest of the launch vehicle and main payloads and, 
furthermore, this standardisation among payloads and 
launchers enables quick exchange of payloads and utilisation 
of launch opportunities at short notice.  
The first CubeSats were launched in June 2003 on Eurockot, 
As CubeSats gained popularity amongst universities and 
start-up companies, similar deployment systems were 
marketed, such as the ISISPOD [34] and QuadPack, a 12U 
multi-deployer with simple and flexible launch adapter 
interfaces developed by European company ISIS to 
accommodate CubeSats on-board a large variety of launch 
vehicles. During launch, the CubeSats are fully enclosed by 
the QuadPack and are only dispensed upon signal by the 
launch vehicle. The QuadPack deployer can be 
preconfigured to one of the various types of the QuadPack 
series to launch any configuration of satellites inside, from a 
combination of 1U, 2U and 3U CubeSats to assemblies of 
1x12U, 2x6U, 4x3U. 
Whilst there are these mechanical constraints in order to 
simplify access to launch opportunities, there is no 
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corresponding electronics form factor or communications 
protocol specified or required by the CubeSat design 
specification, although hardware has consistently utilized 
certain commonly-used and convenient COTS interfaces 
that, importantly, stimulates a maximum of design flexibility 
and innovation. CubeSat missions typically involve 
experiments that can be miniaturized or serve purposes such 
as Earth observation, education and amateur radio. Many 
CubeSats are used to demonstrate spacecraft technologies 
that are targeted for use in (larger) small satellites or that 
present questionable feasibility. 
In the first decade, academia accounted for the majority of 
CubeSat launches until 2013, when over half of launches 
were for non-academic purposes. By 2014, most newly 
deployed CubeSats were for commercial missions built by 
large and small companies alike or for amateur radio 
projects. 2017 saw a record 103 secondary nanosatellites 
launched on an Indian PSLC, of which 101 were using the 
CubeSat configuration launched by dispensers (88 were EO 
CubeSats for Planet, USA). The original objective of the 
CubeSat concept was to give low-budget research programs 
affordable access to space. Unit costs for CubeSat launches 
have ranged from $40,000 in the mid-2000s for a 1U system 
(1 kg, 10x10x10 cm) to nearly $85,000 in 2017 costs through 
providers such as Nanoracks deploying small spacecraft 
from the International Space Station. The European 
company ISIS/ISL have executed or supported more than 10 
launch campaigns on six different launch vehicles, 
successfully sending 250 satellites into orbit by 2017.  
There is no doubt that nano-satellites and especially the 
CubeSat standard has greatly increased access to space for 
smaller organisations and especially educational 
establishments – however there has been a very high failure 
rate, approaching 50% up to 2015, for University-built 
CubeSats [35]. It is speculated that the reason for this is that 
inexperienced students (and faculty) believe that the ‘hard 
part’ is designing, building and testing the subsystems of the 
satellite and that they grossly under-estimate the importance 
of integrated spacecraft-level systems testing and complexity 
of subsequent in-orbit operations (when you cannot press the 
reset button!). It is encouraging to see that in the last couple 
of years the success rate has been increasing as these lessons 
are learned both by teams returning for follow-on missions 
and observed more carefully by those new to the game. 
Indeed, it is suggested to those new teams intending to 
embark on a CubeSat project should first attempt a ‘CanSat’ 
[36], which are in effect small 'satellites' containing all the 
necessary subsystems found in a real satellite - such as power 
and communications - that fit into a 330ml soft drink can and 
are launched on small sounding rockets to an altitude of 
about 1 kilometre. They are equipped with a recovery 
system, usually a parachute, to limit damage upon recovery 
and to allow the CanSat to be reused. The challenge for the 
students is to fit all the major subsystems found in a satellite, 
such as power, sensors and a communication system, into 
this minimal volume and to experience the complexities of 
system integration and field operations – before moving on 
to a more demanding CubeSat project. 
CubeSats have to obey the laws of physics and their limited 
aperture for sensors and limited capacity for solar energy 
collection & storage restricts their utility for many 
operational applications. Similar to the evolution of the 
mobile phone (from a brick to a matchbox and then to a hand-
sized Smartphone), so the initial single-unit CubeSats have 
grown to become multiple units (x3U, x6U x12U – even 
x24U are proposed!).  
 
Fig.1:  the evolution of size versus convenience & capability 
This highlights that it is not so much the CubeSat itself that 
has driven this explosion in nanosatellite but rather the 
standardised (P-POD/QuadPack) launch interface and raised 
the question ‘is there an optimum size of a small satellite’ as 
a trade-off function of physical dimensions/mass (hence 
power & aperture), cost (including launch) and 
spacecraft/mission utility. This was discussed in 2014 [37] 
by reviewing a range of different historical smallsat missions 
constrained to less than 200kg and, although using a limited 
database of satellite characteristics available, it indicated that 
using these factors, a spacecraft configuration with a mass of 
30 kg and dimensions of 50x50x50 cm optimizes spacecraft 
utility, mission utility, and cost. This rudimentary analysis 
and modelling appears to be borne out by the general 
movement of service-oriented CubeSat-based missions to 
multiple units amounting to around ~20-25kg.  
In summary, small satellites demonstrated their ability to 
support a range of missions contributing useful value across 
institutional, commercial and training uses with a lower cost 
of entry for new space players than had previously been 
possible. 
Table-2: small satellites enabling wider access to space 
V. ‘NEWSPACE’  
The combination of commercial utility and low unit cost 
brought small satellites to centre-stage sometime around 
2010 and stimulated proposals for new applications and 
business models that, in turn, excited the investment 
community (who had recovered from or forgotten the earlier 
painful experiences). The modest facilities needed to design 
and build small satellites made them very attractive to 
entrepreneurial and innovative small start-up companies who 
identified new market applications and who could raise 
substantial investment in their ideas. At the same time, 
established space players saw both threats to their business 
and opportunities to diversify and have proposed investing 
in smallsat systems on an even grander scale. Several huge 
global service companies, such as Google, Facebook and 
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Amazon, have entered the fray to ascertain whether this new 
industrial space environment could further enhance their 
market sector dominance.  
Small satellites have become fashionable and form a major 
component of the so-called ‘NewSpace’ environment that 
tends to imply initiatives led by business and industry with 
private funding, rather than the more traditional  model led 
by government agencies. There are a myriad of new space 
business proposals and start-ups with responding to a strong 
investor appetite. In the present decade, some 400 emerging 
space companies have been founded supported by $10Bn in 
investments, all seeking to deliver new applications or 
pursue new approaches to operating in space. Strategic 
investors, wealthy entrepreneurs, and venture capital 
comprise the largest investment by volume, whilst angel 
investors support the greatest number of individual deals. 
Some 35 percent of these emerging space companies have 
secured outside investment, trading equity for growth capital 
as well as access to expertise and key partnerships. Roughly 
$2.5 billion has been invested in small satellites with nearly 
half of that amount taking place in 2017 (excluding 
investments announced for the mega-constellations 
proposed by SpaceX and OneWeb). In most cases it is too 
early to see which will be successful, indeed there has 
already been a considerable degree of consolidation as some 
of the early companies mature or struggle to generate an 
adequate return on investment; just a few examples from the 
major application areas are presented here in order to provide 
a flavour of the activity.  
  
Fig.2:  the growth of ‘NewSpace’ companies 
Earth observation 
Earth observation has undergone a dramatic revolution – 
from the cumbersome and restrictive mechanisms of tasking, 
retrieving and distributing image data by tape and later CD 
to approved and, for high resolution imagery, tightly 
controlled end-user customers. The advent of small satellite 
constellations coupled to the internet, cloud storage and 
advanced processing and distribution methods has changed 
EO from a science to a commodity.  Image data by itself is 
of little value as the user requires actionable knowledge from 
EO products that fuse data from many sources – not just 
space. The evolution of small satellite EO companies 
RapidEye, SkyBox, BlackBridge and Planet (Labs) provide 
examples of the rapid changes that have taken place and 
volatility of the EO small satellite market. 
Skybox Imaging, a start-up company formed in California in 
2009 raised some US$90M and launched its first 83kg EO 
microsatellite, SkySat-1, in 2013 providing 0.9m resolution 
pan and became the first company ever to release HD video 
from space. It captures up to 90-second video clips at 30 
frames per second at a spatial resolution of 1.1 meter at nadir. 
This was followed by a second identical satellite SkySat-2 
satellite launched in 2014 (Soyuz) providing 0.9m pan & 4m 
m/s and 1.1m video and SkySat-3 in 2016 (PSLV). Skybox’s 
approach was to both build the satellites and develop the 
applications processing to help businesses monitor the 
number of ships in a port, the volume of oil in a refinery 
storage tank and the number of trees being cut in a Brazilian 
rain forest [38]. Google acquired SkyBox Imaging for 
around $500M in 2016, and renamed it Terra Bella, with the 
view to increase its space-derived data into Google's vast 
imagery catalogue for applications such as keeping Google 
Maps accurate with up-to-date imagery.  Five further SkySat 
satellites, built by SSL (Space Systems/Loral) were launched 
in 2106 on PSLV & Vega and a further 6 satellites scheduled 
for launch in late 2017 on an Orbital Minotaur. In early 2017, 
however, Google sold Terra Bella and its SkySat satellite 
constellation to Planet Labs for an undisclosed price and 
entered into a multi-year agreement to purchase SkySat 
imaging data. 
Planet-Labs (now ‘Planet’) was founded in San Francisco in 
2011 as a start-up by former NASA employees. Planet 
commenced launching a new constellation of EO CubeSats 
with the objective of collecting the entire land mass of the 
Earth every day at 3-5 meters resolution in R,G,B NIR 
wavelengths. Planet designed and manufactured 5 kg 
CubeSats with a “3U” form factor (10cm x 10cm x 30cm) 
with fold-out solar arrays and antennas and a 3-year design 
lifetime. Called ‘Doves’, Planet’s first demonstration 
CubeSats were launched in 2013 and were followed by the 
first ‘flocks’ of multiple cubesats to form their constellation.  
The Flocks were delivered into orbit using standard CubeSat 
dispensers on various launchers (e.g. ISS, PSLV, Dnepr, 
Antares, Soyuz, Falcon-9) into a variety of orbits between 
400km/52º and 500-700km SSO. On February 15, 2017, 
Planet launched 88 satellites that, to date, was the largest 
fleet of satellites on a single launch (PSLV) and brought their 
total number launched into orbit to 149. Without on-board 
propulsion, the Dove cubesats used differential 
(atmospheric) drag to separate the satellites around their 
orbit planes, taking about 6 months after launch [39] [40].  
Planet’s operational concept is to image continuously at 
nadir when over land and use its own global network of 
ground stations to support both spacecraft mission 
operations and image data downlink. The downlinked image 
files are transferred from local ground station servers to 
Planet’s cloud infrastructure for ingestion into the 
company’s data processing and distribution pipeline. 
Planet’s user base is broad, including traditional EO value-
add businesses and the science community taking advantage 
of the daily data—timescales that sparser observations from 
other satellites and aircraft could not provide. 
As we have seen earlier, RapidEye (Germany) was the first 
commercial EO constellation of small satellites but ran into 
financial problems and, after bankruptcy, was acquired by 
BlackBridge (Canada) in 2011 and then in turn acquired by 
Planet in 2015, adding its 5 RapidEye microsatellites to their 
Flocks of Cubesats. Planet then acquired Terra Bella, 
formerly Skybox Imaging, from Google in February 2017 
adding a further 7 satellites bringing Planet’s total to around 
190 small EO satellites in orbit.  Planet has raised around 
y$160M from some 20 investors, in addition to its 
undisclosed equity arrangements with Google. 
Iceye, a start-up company based in Finland, recently secured 
$13M for their proposed constellation of microsatellites 
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providing SAR imagery, ranging from urban planning and 
tracking port activity to environmental and agricultural 
applications. 
SSTL had pioneered operational EO micro- and mini-
satellites through the DMC, with the satellite owner 
operating the system and image data being sold by the sq.km 
or further downstream as value-added products. In 2015, 
SSTL adopted an innovative business model borrowed from 
the geostationary communication market, in which many 
service providers lease transponder bandwidth and time from 
satellite owners on a broadly pay-as-you-go basis that allows 
a maximum of flexibility in response to demand for the 
service provider whilst minimising capital outlay. SSTL 
adapted this model to the EO market by building and 
launching three 450kg EO minisatellites and retaining 
ownership and operations in orbit operated and leasing 
guaranteed imaging payload capacity was leased to separate 
international EO service operators, thus allowing them to 
concentrate on the imaging service for their customers 
without needing to be concerned with the satellite operations 
& housekeeping.  The initial constellation of three optical 
EO minisatellites was launched into a 686km SSO on PSLV 
in 2015 providing high-quality 1-metre GSD (0.85m 
processed) pan and 4-metre GSD multispectral imagery able 
to provide daily imaging worldwide. The capacity on the first 
three satellites in the constellation was leased by a single 
customer but a fourth identical optical minisatellite and a 
small S-band SAR minisatellite (NovaSAR)  are due to be 
added to the constellation in early 2018 with multiple ‘time-
shared’ capacity access users.  
LEO communications-based services 
Small satellites have triggered a relatively recent resurgence 
of interest in using LEO constellations for communications-
based services, such as IoT8 and machine-to-machine data 
exchange, tracking ships using the Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) and tracking aircraft in flight using Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS–B). Again, there 
are many organisations proposing a range of services using 
small satellites in LEO so the following recent ‘start-up’ 
initiatives are selected simply as examples of different 
business models. 
exactEarth, founded in 2009 by COM DEV (Canada), 
arguably pioneered satellite AIS (S-AIS) data services for 
ship tracking and maritime situational awareness. Initially 
using a constellation 9 cubesats mainly in polar orbits, the 
service was enhanced in 2017 with the launch of 9 S-AIS 
payloads hosted un-board the Iridium-Next constellation. 
This addition provides improved coverage and latency of 
data delivery and added a new machine-to-machine 
(M2M/IoT) sensor network service as an alternative low‐cost 
maritime communications channel supporting the 
emergence of e-Navigation and the Maritime Cloud. 
Spire Global, founded in 2012, funded its first educational 
satellite ArduSat via crowd funding and $106,330 was raised 
via Kickstarter. In 2014 it focused on becoming a data 
analytics provider that uses S-AIS information provided by 
a constellation of cubesats to track ships on the high sea. 
Spire initially raised $25M and in 2016 a further $40M and 
has launched around 50 cubesats. 
                                                          
8 IoT = Internet of Things  
GOMSpace, founded in Denmark in 2007 specialises in 
advanced radio technologies launched its first cubesat in 
2013 to demonstrate aircraft tracking from space based on 
reception of ADS-B signals using software defined radio 
techniques and its subsequent GOM-X mission in 2016. 
GOMSpace is a supplier of nanosatellite platforms, payloads 
and services in collaboration with a number of service 
partners and customers.  
Sky and Space Global successfully completed full capability 
tests in September 2017 for phone calls, instant message, 
voice recording and image transfers through its 3 Diamonds 
commercial demonstration nano-satellites (built by 
GOMSpace). This was the first time ever that a voice call has 
been facilitated by nano-satellites and represents a huge 
breakthrough for the company and the telecoms and satellite 
industries late June 2017, have also demonstrated their 
capability to facilitate the exchange of text messages, voice 
recordings and images between different users.  
Hawkeye360 (Virginia, USA, 2015) have raised $10M and 
are proposing a space-based radio frequency (RF) mapping 
and analytics system using nanosatellites to provide a space-
based global intelligence network. 
Audacity, another Stanford start-up in 2015, with $7M 
investment is a space communications service provider 
continuous space communications access through a 
constellation of small satellites using inter-satellite links. 
Cloud Constellation (Los Angeles 2015) intends to establish 
its ‘SpaceBelt’ independent space-based Cloud network 
infrastructure using inter-satellite links in a small satellite 
constellation to offer secure storage and transfer data around 
the world, without exposure to any terrestrial 
communications infrastructure. 
These examples covering new EO and LEO communications 
services illustrate the variety and volatility of the small 
satellite private sector and ‘NewSpace’ communities that 
have attracted large investments and a huge amount of media 
attention. However, this emerging space market remains at 
an early stage in development. Few companies have reached 
peak operations, and delivery of promised game-changing 
products and services have yet to achieve significant return 
on investments made. The emerging space market is 
undoubtedly vibrant, novel, and with strong potential to 
change the face of the space industry – but the perception of 
its success is still somewhat different from reality.  
Fig.3:  the comparative growth in launches of small satellite 
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VI. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
The exponential (Moore’s Law) advancement in capability 
of microelectronics, MEMS, materials and production 
techniques has stimulated a ‘gold rush’ of investments into 
so-called NewSpace businesses and  ambitious projects – 
large and small. Amongst these are a number of proposals 
for so-called ‘mega’ constellations of small satellites 
numbering in 100’s to 1000’s that, if they mature, would 
radically change both the communications and Earth 
observation space business. 
‘Mega’ Constellations 
Providing ubiquitous broadband communications anywhere 
across the globe has been the holy grail of satellite business 
for decades and dominated by the geostationary satellite 
service operators. Early attempts at using LEO systems 
proved technically demanding and financially disastrous, 
however technical advances in both satellites and, 
importantly, in the terrestrial terminal and network 
infrastructures coupled with an increasing need for low 
latency communications, have encouraged a new 
propositions. To provide ubiquitous communications or truly 
persistent Earth observation from LEO necessitates a 
constellation of a large number of satellites in a multiple 
planes. 
Fig.4: applications for proposed smallsat constellations 
Boeing plans to launch and operate a network of 1,396 
satellites at 1200km in 35 planes orbiting at 45 degrees’ 
inclination, and six planes at 55 degrees employing V-band 
with each satellite's footprint subdivided into thousands of 8-
11-km-diameter cells, with each cell using up to 5 GHz of 
bandwidth. A further 1,560 satellites are then planned to be 
launched later, adding 12 more planes at 55 degrees 
inclination at the same 1,200km orbit, and 21 planes inclined 
at 88 degrees and orbiting at 1,000 km. 
SpaceX plans a LEO constellation consisting of 4,425 
satellites, operating at V-band in 83 planes at between 1,110 
to 1,325 km with a further 7,518 satellites in Ka- and Ku-
band to provide ubiquitous high-bandwidth broadband 
services eventually up to 1Gbps per user for consumers and 
businesses.   
Telesat describes its V-band LEO constellation as one that 
“will follow closely the design of the Ka-band LEO 
Constellation,” also using 117 satellites as a second-
generation overlay. 
OneWeb, formerly known as WorldVu, has raised $1.2Bn for 
a planned satellite constellation consisting initially of 648 
(although later updated to 882) microsatellites of about 125-
150 kg operating in 1200 km orbits each capable of 
delivering at least 8 gigabits per second of throughput via a 
Ku-band payload to provide worldwide internet access for 
individual consumers and airlines. OneWeb will build the 
satellites at a new purpose-built highly-automated factory in 
Florida capable of churning out 15 satellites per week at a 
price targeted below $0.5m per satellite and expects to 
transform satellite manufacturing by dramatically lowering 
the cost in large volumes for high-performance space 
applications. 
The total number of small satellites that have been proposed 
for various constellations amounts to nearly 25,000 of which 
around 23,000 are for communications, 1500 are Earth 
observation and another 800 in various services. Even if only 
a fraction of these proposals make it to reality, the 
manufacture of such huge numbers of satellites allows, for 
the first time, true mass production techniques to be 
employed – even though the numbers are small compared to 
the consumer market for electronics and automobiles. These 
large constellations are forcing designers to adopt more 
industrial approaches and driving suppliers to invest in 
automation of manufacture and test in order to achieve unit 
production low cost at a high delivery tempo. The question 
is how will this radically different design/manufacturing 
capability and capacity impact the relatively lower quantity 
small satellite business. On the one hand it may enable new 
business concepts to be brought to market quicker and at low 
cost – assuming that the big players are prepared to provide 
access to their production lines to start-ups who may 
challenge their current mega-systems, but on the other hand 
if the production lines are inflexible, this may stifle 
innovation.  
Small satellites in GEO 
The provision of high capacity communications, whether 
voice, television or data for civil, domestic or military 
services, has driven the development of steadily larger 
(7,000kg) and longer-lifetime satellites (>15 years) where 
the economies of scale yield clear $/Mbps benefits although 
with initial high capital investment. However, the ever-
shortening technology development cycles and more agile 
business models have begun to call this model into question 
with interest by operators growing in smaller (~2500kg) 
lower capital cost, shorter lifetime (~5-7 years) satellites that 
could be operated in clusters allowing greater agility, more 
rapid technology refresh and lower individual launch costs. 
The smaller highly re-configurable Quantum satellite under 
construction by SSTL & Airbus for EutelSat will test this 
hypothesis in 2019. 
Space-Wide-Web? 
The expectation of consumers is to have access to digital 
services all the time and everywhere. In developed urban 
areas, the roll-out of 5G infrastructure using high microwave 
frequencies and micro-cells will provide high data-rate (up 
to Gbps?) with very low latency for applications ranging 
from the Internet of Things (IoT), observations from HAPs 
and drones, public safety and autonomous driving, to 
extreme video and gaming. However, there are large tracts 
of the globe without even 2G infrastructure. Satellite 
networks, both LEO and GEO, will be essential to provide 
geographic ubiquity by backhauling and trunking for 
delivery of 5G services in all parts of the globe on the 
ground, in the air and at sea. Intelligent and optimized traffic 
management via satellite, such as content push, can support 
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offloading from terrestrial-mobile networks to alleviate 
congestion and ensure network resilience.  
Thus we will see the convergence of terrestrial and space 
networks resulting in not just the world-wide-web but into a 
space-wide-web, extending to EO and scientific satellites, 
the ISS and eventually outposts on Moon & Mars.  
What next for small satellites? 
The physical design and construction techniques for 
satellites have been dictated and constrained by the launcher 
volume under the fairing and ascent phase dynamics 
(vibration, noise, shock). This has been the case from the 
very first launches of tiny satellites to the present day 
leviathans. Ground assembly and integration into a launch 
vehicle imposes significant limitations on the size, volume 
and design of payloads that can be accommodated within the 
fairing of a single launch vehicle, the largest of which is less 
than six metres in diameter. The structural designs for large, 
complex satellites are challenging but are really only 
necessary to survive the aggressive first 20 minutes or so of 
ascent to orbit. NASA’s James Webb telescope, for example 
and costing some US$9Bn, is about the largest practicable 
telescope that can be origami-folded into the largest 
available launcher fairing. A different approach will be 
needed for the next generation of telescope if, say, double the 
aperture is required.  
Small satellites generally are less structurally complex as 
they are physically compact and have lower coupling to the 
launcher environment. An effective means of constructing 
large apertures in space could be through robotic assembly 
in orbit of numbers of small satellites Lego-like to form 
physically larger structures that could be used for optical, 
radar or communications applications – for business, 
scientific or exploration objectives. The structures can be 
reconfigurable in orbit to meet changing mission objectives, 
such as spare apertures trading resolution against signal-to-
noise. The small and relatively robust ‘Lego-satellites’ can 
be launched in space-efficient stacks on a number of 
launchers meaning, in principle, an unlimited size of 
assembled structure in orbit. The challenges associated with 
precise autonomous robotic assembly in orbit are not trivial, 
especially if optical alignments are required.  
In order to demonstrate this concept, the "Autonomous 
Assembly of a Reconfigurable Space Telescope" (AAReST) 
mission [41] has been developed by CatTech, JPL, Surrey, 
IIST. It is a prime focus design with the primary mirror 
divided into a sparse aperture consisting of an arrangement 
of 10cm diameter circular mirrors attached to a cluster of 
Cubesats, two of which are able to undock from the cluster 
and navigate independently. The telescope then deploys its 
sensor package to the focus of the mirror array using a 
deployable boom and, using wavefront sensors, the mirrors 
can be adjusted and calibrated in order to minimize the size 
of the mirrors' individual point spread function (PSF). Once 
the initial calibration and imaging requirements have been 
met two of the mirror segments, carried by independent 
Cubesats equipped with propulsion systems, are to detach 
from the mirror cluster, perform an orbital manoeuvre to 
reposition themselves at a new location in the array, and then 
re-dock to the cluster to demonstrate on-orbit assembly of 
the mirror segments. Once the cluster is reassembled, the 
mirror calibration and imaging are to be performed again in 
                                                          
9 Exabyte = 1012 MB 
order to show the capability of calibration in various 
configurations. 
The logical next step from in-orbit assembly is to exploit 
terrestrial developments in additive (and subtractive) 
manufacturing techniques (so-called 3-D printing) to move 
the manufacturing of software-defined spacecraft into orbit 
[42]. Eventually raw materials alone are launched and then 
design software uploaded to manufacture the required 
functions on ‘gossamer’ spacecraft – thus completely 
bypassing the structural constraints of the launch phase and, 
possibly, also simplifying the demands on the launcher itself 
leading to lower launch costs. 
Over the next decade, the amount of data that will be 
cumulatively downlinked by small satellites is expected to 
reach 3.9 exabytes9. Traditional RF capabilities are unlikely 
to be able to meet this demand for increasing 
communications rate and hence bandwidth for both 
individual and constellations of small satellites to support the 
new services being proposed. This has spurred the 
development of optical communications terminals. Initially 
rather massive and power-hungry, Bridgesat formed in 2015 
is applying technology sourced from The Aerospace 
Corporation and Draper and with an initial $6M investments, 
is developing  compact, low power in-space optical terminals 
to transmit data at rates up to 2.5 Gbps with the intention to 
increase this to 10Gbps. 
VII. CONSTRAINTS ON SMALL SATELLITES 
There are several factors that currently constrain the 
development of the small satellite business of which the most 
intractable of these is launch to orbit. There are also other 
concerns regarding, for example, space debris, EO policies 
and communications frequency allocations, but these are 
major topics in their own right and beyond the scope of this 
paper, so will only be brought to the reader’s attention for 
further reference. 
Small satellite launchers 
The availability of timely and low cost launch to orbit has 
been the major constraint upon the growth of the small 
satellite market. The first experimental and amateur radio 
small satellites up to the 1990’s benefited from sporadic 
opportunities as secondary payloads carried either free or at 
only nominal cost. Once micro and then nanosatellites 
became more business-like in the 1990’s, ‘free launches’ 
were no longer offered. Arianespace was the first to offer a 
repeatable, commercial launch service for microsatellites on 
their Ariane-4 ‘ASAP’ (Ariane Structure for auxiliary 
Payloads) and this proved to be a key stimulus to the nascent 
smallsat industry but limited to 50kg maximum mass and a 
maximum envelope of approx. 35x35x70 cm. As the demand 
for smallsat launches increased, coinciding with the fall of 
the Soviet Union and a need in Russia for export currency, a 
number of launchers such as Cosmos, Tsyklon, Zenit, Dnepr, 
Rockot and Start-1 (derived from earlier missiles) became 
available through Russian and Ukrainian entities. These 
provided more launch options with regard to orbit, mass and 
envelop – although the negotiation and bureaucracy 
surrounding the arrangement of launch services as well as 
the management of unpredictable schedules were at times 
more challenging. The Cosmos and converted Ukrainian 
Dnepr launchers were particularly suited for dedicated 
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launches of clusters of small satellites, such as the DMC, 
from ~2000 to 2015 but for primarily political reasons the 
Dnepr has been gradually phased out in favour of Soyuz and 
the new Russian launcher Angara that have proved 
considerably more expensive.  
Pegasus air launch (Orbital) was used for a number of 
government and commercial small missions (e.g. Orbcomm) 
but has a limited envelope and is costly thus not suitable for 
typical ‘NewSpace’ companies – although it does have an 
advantage of being able to launch at, in principle, any 
latitude/inclination and any location without many of the 
constraints of a launch site infrastructure.  
Launching small satellites from ISS has been used mainly for 
P-POD encapsulated nanosatellites but the man-rating 
processes has not made this an inexpensive option and results 
in an elliptical orbit with an apogee of 380 - 420 km and 
inclination of 51.6°, with a satellite life expectancy of 100 - 
250 days. 
The mushrooming of nano- and micro-satellites in the last 
few years has encouraged a surge in small launcher 
developments – both from agencies (e.g. Vega/ESA, 
Epsilon/Japan, KuaiZhou/China) and start-ups (e.g. Rocket 
Lab, Orbital Express) – indeed some 50 new small launch 
vehicles are in various stages of development (Fig). Several 
of the proposals for new launchers emphasise a move away 
from highly toxic to ‘green’ propellants, which is certainly 
to be encouraged. There is a common misconception that 
small launchers result in lower $/kg for small satellites: thus 
far, this has not be borne out in practice as costs and size do 
not decrease linearly but tend to hit a minimum due to 
development, launch site and range safety costs. Small 
launchers in the range of 100kg-250kg to SSO can offer 
advantages for customers prepared to pay a premium for 
quick call-up launch on demand for military, security or 
replenishment missions. Large launchers can offer the lowest 
$/kg but small satellites are unable to utilise their full load 
capacity and rideshare brings the schedule and orbit 
constraints mentioned earlier. The launcher ‘sweet spot’ 
appears to be for medium launchers capable of 1200-1500kg 
to SSO such as Dnepr and PSLV where payloads with 
similar orbit and schedule requirements can sensibly be 
aggregated and the full mass and envelope capacity of the 
launcher utilise to its full extent yielding the best 
combination of $/kg, orbit choice, and schedule. 
Space-X developed the Falcon-1 launcher for small satellites 
2008, Falcon-1 became the first privately-developed liquid-
fuel launch vehicle to orbit  the Earth – on its fourth attempt. 
In 2009, Falcon-1 achieved SpaceX's first commercial 
launch when it successfully delivered the Malaysian 
(RazakSat) satellite to equatorial orbit.  Following this fifth 
launch, the Falcon-1 was retired and succeeded by Falcon-9 
to address the more lucrative big satellite launch market 
leaving regular and affordable dedicated small satellite 
launches essentially to PSLV and, less regularly, DNEPR & 
Eurokot.  
It is possible that air-launch proposals (e.g. Virgin Galactic) 
targeting the space tourism market, might be able to offer 
competitive small satellite launch and an additional service 
(e.g. Virgin Orbit), however like Pegasus it is likely to be a 
high $/kg option as the aircraft costs are not likely to be much 
lower that a streamlined ground launch infrastructure and the 
efficiency gains from air launch are not very significant – the 
main advantage still being freedom of launch location. The 
list of abandoned air launch projects is indicative of the 
difficulty of the business case. 
It is interesting to observe that several space and launch 
agencies are seeing the commercial possibilities of small sat 
launches. Antrix (PSLV), Glavkosmos (Soyuz), Arianespace 
(Ariane 6, Vega C) are all actively pursuing this business for 
their medium & large rockets. New operators like Blue 
Origin are also looking at this market, especially the 
constellations. One new trend is the emergence of launch 
brokers (like Spaceflight and TriSept) that accumulate 
customers for specific rideshare missions- sometimes even 
buying the entire capacity of the rocket (like a Falcon 9). 
Brokers can provide access to launchers that might not be 
available for an individual small sat customer. 
 So the costs of getting small satellites into orbit is still a 
major driver of the mission cost and associated commercial 
business cases that also does not encourage fundamental 
change to satellite design. The various new launcher 
proposals aim to reduce costs by 10’s of percent, which is of 
course welcomed, but cost reductions of 90% are needed to 
stimulate radical satellite design and manufacturing 
approaches that can create new business models.   
Frequency allocations & co-ordination 
The plethora of University-class nano-satellites & Cubesats 
launched since 2005 has brought pressure on suitable 
frequency spectrum allocations as many have used VHF & 
UHF allocations intended for the Amateur Satellite Service 
or adjacent commercial allocations and this has caused 
considerable congestion as the bandwidth available is very 
restricted. Fortunately, many of the University-class 
nanosatellites are quite short-lived, sometimes less than 6 
months before re-entry, thus allowing frequency re-use, but 
as the capabilities and ambitions of these small satellite 
builders grows, so does their demand for spectrum.  
The spectrum demands for many new start-up business 
services are now competing for the larger, but still finite, 
bandwidths at low microwave frequencies (1-10GHz) 
allocated for communications and remote sensing services.  
The proposed new ‘mega-constellations’ that aim to provide 
ubiquitous digital communications and high persistence 
global Earth observation are in a different category 
altogether. Here, the bandwidths required dictate the use of 
higher microwave allocations such as V-band (35GHz) for 
SpaceX, Boeing and Telesat (Canada); Ku-band (11/14GHz) 
& Ka-band (20-30GHz) for OneWeb that are being fiercely 
contested and where concerns have been raised regarding 
their compatibility with the established geostationary 
satellite services.  
Small satellites & space debris 
The first pieces of space debris were parts of Sputnik 1 in 
1957. There are now more than 23000 objects 10 cm or larger 
in size that are being tracked in LEO with most debris in a 
belt between 600 and 1200 km above the Earth, with another 
belt at around 1450 km. The density of debris is close to the 
threshold of the “Kessler Effect”, in which collisions lead to 
a runaway increase in numbers of pieces of debris. Small sats 
themselves are not a major problem as space debris, 
providing they do not fragment and have a natural end-of-
life de-orbit through low altitudes or some de-orbit device 
(e.g. a drag sail, as demonstrated in 2017 by the InflateSail 
nanosatellite that de-orbited in ~70 days from an initial 
505km SSO [42]). It was said that one factor in the original 
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concept of the 10x10x10 cm CubeSats was based on the 
minimum size that the US Air Force publicly acknowledged 
it could track in low Earth orbit. The only serious problem 
small satellites pose regarding additional debris generation is 
if there were to be a significant number of them in low Earth 
orbit that do not comply with the de-orbit guidelines and do 
not possess propulsion to manoeuvre out of the way of debris 
– assuming of course that they are also designed with 
minimum risk of fragmentation. 
The larger microsatellites and mini-satellites increasingly 
have propulsion systems for precise orbit injection and 
constellation lifetime station-keeping and collision 
avoidance; at the end of operational life, these satellites then 
use their remaining propellant to reduce their orbital perigee 
altitude in order to speed up re-entry. Of course, great care 
needs to be taken to minimise the risk the fragmentation of 
these satellites due to pressurised or unstable propellants.  
Several small satellite missions are being proposed for active 
debris removal, such as the EU (European Union) low cost 
in-orbit microsatellite demonstrator mission 
”RemoveDebris” and commercial projects such as by start-
up Astroscale based in Singapore, Japan & UK.  There are 
significant political and legal sensitivities surrounding active 
debris removal and, again, extreme care needs to be taken 
not to generate yet more (even tiny) debris in the process of 
removal and de-orbit.  
If the large numbers of satellites proposed for LEO actually 
materialises, especially in constellations, then the same 
drivers that led to the global air traffic control system on 
Earth may also lead to the creation of an analogous space 
traffic control system, especially as the quantity of space 
debris continues to increase.  
EO policy – shutter control, privacy 
High resolution remote sensing from space was, until very 
recently, the preserve of governments and hence under their 
direct control. The new EO industry changes the notion that 
observations are all about science or intelligence, it is now 
about business and the line between public and private 
information becomes blurred. The delivery mechanisms for 
EO data are also changing dramatically, bringing access 
online to the individuals or SME’s on a ‘per pixel’ or 
processed value-added basis. The advent of privately-owned 
commercial smallsat EO constellations providing both high 
spatial and temporal resolution are challenging the relevance 
and practicality of existing policies and regulatory 
mechanisms. Countries, to a greater or lesser extent, 
currently control data collection and delivery and can impose 
interruption of service for national security or political 
reasons. Once global, persistent imaging becomes common-
place, with resolutions of 0.5m or better and delivery to the 
general user in minutes, possibly seconds, then current 
control policies will be ineffective, in much the same way as 
control over communications was lost with the advent of the 
internet. This raises issues of both national security and 
personal privacy that will have to be addressed in the 
immediate future as a matter of some urgency.  
There is a question regarding how best to manage the public-
funded EO data sources that benefit from free access to 
stimulate exploitation and private-sector EO initiatives that 
need a return on their financial investments that see the 
former as potentially undermining their business case. 
Currently, this is being addressed through the managing the 
‘freshness’ of data so as to maintain the private sector 
incentive, but this mechanism is unlikely to be sustainable 
much into the future: the analogy of the shift from film 
cinemas to video store to off-air set-top recoding to internet 
streaming bears a moments consideration. 
The deluge of data from remote sensing satellites, airborne 
platforms and in-situ sensors (including social media) 
already poses several data handling, quality and provenance 
issues. Agreements on meta-data standards across all these 
platforms will be needed if reliable knowledge is to be 
distilled from these sources. 
VIII.   CONCLUSIONS 
Present day small satellites in many instances now rival and 
in some aspects surpass the capabilities of traditional large 
satellites but at a fraction of the cost; however small satellite 
missions do not replace large satellite missions, as their goals 
and issues are often different, rather they complement them. 
For instance, in providing high temporal coverage, or global 
coverage from LEO with minimal communication delays. It 
is true to say that the technologies that are used by small 
satellites are not fundamentally different to those employed 
on large satellite – the difference is primarily in the speed of 
adoption of new technologies and especially COTS devices 
to achieve rapid product cycles with high utility at low cost, 
combined with a more agile management and business style. 
There is a similar relation between small and large satellites 
as exists between microprocessors and mainframe or super-
computers: some problems are better addressed via 
distributed systems, for example, constellations of small 
satellites (typically for global coverage), while others may 
require centralized systems (e.g. a large optical instrument, 
as in a space telescope or a high-power direct broadcast 
communications system).  
In particular, modern small satellites in low Earth orbit are 
radically changing the Earth observation/remote sensing and 
digital communications space business through increasing 
use of machine-to-machine exchanges linking the ‘Internet 
of Things’ with ‘big data’ warehouses and AI data mining 
and knowledge extraction.  
Enormous investments from the private sector have been 
attracted to a large number of new companies with new 
services and this has been a major enabler of innovation. The 
next five years will show which of these yields the expected 
return on investments and considerable consolidation in the 
sector is to be expected. 
The greatest impediment to the rapid development of the 
small satellite sector is the cost and availability of launch to 
orbit. Whilst there is a movement to produce more cost-
effective launchers – both small and large – there are few 
solutions on the near horizon.  
The ‘mega’ constellations being proposed will stimulate 
processes for the mass production of small satellites and 
maybe also small launchers. They could also lead to not only 
‘digital factories’ on Earth but autonomous space assembly 
of large systems comprising of thousands of “smart” nano- 
and micro-satellite “Lego” blocks and, ultimately, in-orbit 
manufacturing of satellites and space vehicles. 
Small satellites have become fashionable and are catalysing 
new applications and business models – just as their 
terrestrial counterparts the laptop and smartphone have done. 
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The emerging ‘NewSpace’ sector is vibrant, innovative, and 
with strong potential to change the face of the space industry 
and the space-enabled services for the greater benefit of the 
global population. 
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